California Trial Lawyers Keep a War Chest of Up to $30 Million After the Uber Deal

California trial lawyers are keeping a political war chest of up to $30 million in reserve after their deal with Uber, according to a Daily Journal report published October 18, 2026. The Consumer Attorneys of California (CAOC) and allied committees raised roughly $80 million for a November ballot fight, spent at least $48 million reaching the SB 623 compromise instead, and now plan to hold what is left as a standing deterrent against the next tort reform ballot measure.

The report matters beyond Sacramento. California is the largest personal injury market in the country, and the 2026 fight showed that a single well-funded company can put the economics of the plaintiffs' bar on a statewide ballot. Uber's measure would have written a 25 percent cap on the Contingency Fee into the California Constitution. The trial bar headed it off with a counter-initiative, a fundraising drive that matched Uber almost dollar for dollar, and a negotiated statute. The California trial lawyers war chest is the bar's answer to what happens next time: start the fight with money already in the bank.

What the Daily Journal reported on October 18

The Daily Journal story, reproduced by the aggregator Archynewsy, makes four points.

First, the money. CAOC and its allied political committees entered 2026 preparing for a November ballot battle and raised roughly $80 million. Campaign finance records cited in the report show the committees spent at least $48 million on this year's legislative and ballot fights and had less than $30 million left.

Second, the purpose. The plaintiffs' bar is keeping the remaining money as a political fund to deter future tort reform initiatives rather than refunding it or spending it down. Roger A. Dreyer, a Sacramento trial lawyer at Dreyer Babich Buccola Wood Campora LLP who has led CAOC's PAC board for four years, argued that a standing fund means the organization starts with capital in hand if another entity targets the civil justice system.

Third, the friction. The same filings have exposed divisions over which lawyers paid into the fund and which did not. According to the report, the tension surfaced at the Consumer Attorneys Association of Los Angeles convention in Las Vegas, where trial lawyer Nick Rowley withdrew from a scheduled panel after objecting to speaking and exhibitor slots going to attorneys who had not contributed to the ballot campaign or who face ethics complaints.

Fourth, the context. The money was raised to defeat Uber's initiative and to qualify a competing rideshare-safety measure. Both were withdrawn after Governor Gavin Newsom signed SB 623 in June.

The report is a single outlet's reading of campaign finance filings, and the figures below are cross-checked against state and third-party data where that is possible.

How much money do California trial lawyers have left after the Uber deal?

California trial lawyers have less than $30 million left after the Uber deal, according to the Daily Journal's reading of state campaign finance records. That figure is the difference between roughly $80 million raised and at least $48 million spent by CAOC and its allied committees during 2026.

Public data are consistent with that order of magnitude but measure slightly different things, so the numbers need care:

• CalMatters, reporting on the deal in June, put CAOC's fundraising for its initiative at about $77 million.
• Transparency USA, which republishes Cal-Access data, lists the Alliance Against Corporate Abuse, the ballot committee sponsored by CAOC, at $77,312,854.21 in contributions and $83,704,994.96 in expenditures.
• The FPPC's top-contributor list for pending and circulating November 2026 measures shows the CAOC Initiative Defense PAC giving $30,000,000 to the Alliance committee, the largest single contribution on its list.

The expenditure figure is larger than the Daily Journal's "spent" figure because California committee reports count money moved between affiliated committees as both a contribution and an expenditure. A dollar that leaves the Initiative Defense PAC for the Alliance committee appears on both sets of books. Netting those transfers out is why a reporter can arrive at "at least $48 million" spent while a raw database total shows more than $83 million going out the door from a single committee. Readers should treat "less than $30 million" as the best available estimate of uncommitted money, not an audited balance.

Measure of the 2026 money	Figure	Source
Raised by CAOC and allied committees	Roughly $80 million	Daily Journal, Oct. 18, 2026
Spent on legislative and ballot fights	At least $48 million	Daily Journal, Oct. 18, 2026
Remaining war chest	Less than $30 million	Daily Journal, Oct. 18, 2026
Alliance Against Corporate Abuse contributions	$77,312,854.21	Cal-Access via Transparency USA
Alliance Against Corporate Abuse expenditures (includes transfers)	$83,704,994.96	Cal-Access via Transparency USA
CAOC Initiative Defense PAC transfer to Alliance	$30,000,000	FPPC top-contributor list
CAOC initiative fundraising at deal time	About $77 million	CalMatters, June 2026
Uber money behind its initiative	About $78 million	CalMatters, June 2026

Why are California plaintiffs' lawyers keeping a political war chest?

California plaintiffs' lawyers are keeping a political war chest so that the next tort reform initiative meets an opponent already funded on day one, instead of one that has to raise $80 million from scratch while signatures are being gathered. That is the logic Dreyer described, and it tracks how California initiative fights actually work.

An initiative's sponsor controls the calendar. It chooses when to file with the Attorney General, when to circulate, and how much to spend on signatures. The opposition reacts. In 2026 that meant CAOC spent the early part of the cycle building a fund while Uber, the sole donor to its own committee, could write checks at will. A standing fund changes that dynamic in two ways. It lets the bar respond immediately to a filed measure, including by qualifying its own counter-initiative, which proved to be the bargaining chip that brought Uber to the table. And it signals to the next would-be sponsor, whether an insurer coalition, a trucking group or another platform company, that a ballot campaign will be expensive from the first week.

There is also a negotiating rationale. The 2026 fight ended in a legislative deal rather than at the ballot box, and the same was true of the 2022 MICRA fight. In both cases the party with a credible, funded threat of an expensive November campaign had leverage over the terms of the bill. Money in reserve preserves that leverage between election cycles.

How much did Uber and the Consumer Attorneys of California raise for the 2026 ballot fight?

Uber and the Consumer Attorneys of California each raised or committed more than $75 million for the 2026 ballot fight: CalMatters reported about $78 million allocated by Uber and about $77 million raised by CAOC when the deal closed in June. Together that is more than $150 million assembled for two measures that never reached voters.

Uber was the only donor to its committee, and the San Francisco Standard described a $77 million plan as early as May 2026. The trial bar's money came from a broad base. The Standard reported that the lawyers and their allies had raised around $75 million from more than 1,000 contributors by spring, with the largest single source being CAOC's own Initiative Defense PAC. Not all of the money was spent on advertising. Benzinga, summarizing the television war, put combined spending on the months of ads at more than $50 million, which is consistent with each side having money left when the deal was struck.

What Uber's ballot measure would have done

Uber's measure, filed as Initiative 25-0022 and titled the "Protecting Automobile Accident Victims from Attorney Self-Dealing Act," was a proposed amendment to the California Constitution, not an ordinary statute. That choice mattered: a constitutional amendment cannot be changed by the Legislature and is harder to challenge or repeal.

Its core provisions, as summarized by both supporters and opponents, were:

• A 25 percent fee cap. Attorneys' fees in motor vehicle accident cases would have been capped at 25 percent of the recovery, with the claimant keeping at least 75 percent. Critics stressed that the attorney's share would also have had to cover litigation costs such as experts, discovery and filing fees, which made the effective cap lower than the headline rate.
• All crashes, not just rideshare. The cap would have reached every motor vehicle accident case in California, whether or not Uber, Lyft or any rideshare company was involved.
• Medical damages. Recoverable medical expenses would have been tied to benchmark rates rather than billed amounts, and Medical Lien arrangements would have been restricted, which goes to what the defense bar calls "phantom damages."
• Enforcement. Attorneys charging more would have faced State Bar discipline and, by some accounts, misdemeanor exposure.

CAOC's response was a competing initiative focused on rideshare safety: stricter annual background checks, public reporting of sexual misconduct incidents, and greater liability for rideshare companies when a passenger is sexually assaulted by a driver. That measure gave the bar a weapon aimed directly at Uber's business, not just a defensive campaign.

What does SB 623 do?

SB 623 limits what injured plaintiffs can recover for treatment from lien-based medical providers in crashes involving rideshare companies, restricts the sale of medical liens and lawyer-provider referral ties, and tightens driver background checks, while leaving contingency fees uncapped. It was the price of both sides withdrawing their initiatives.

The main terms, drawn from the bill's legislative history and from practitioner summaries of the enacted text, are:

• Scope. It applies only to automobile accidents involving transportation network companies such as Uber and Lyft, not to all crashes as Uber's measure would have.
• Lien-based treatment. Where the plaintiff is treated by a lien-based provider, the recoverable amount for that care is limited by reference to the 70th percentile of FAIR Health billed charges, or a comparable commercial database, for the same or similar service in the area. Billed amounts above that ceiling are unenforceable.
• Lien sales. Where a medical lien has been sold, recovery for that expense is limited to what was actually paid to acquire it, and those transactions are discoverable.
• Referrals. An attorney working on contingency may not refer a client to a provider in which the lawyer or an immediate family member has a direct ownership interest, and may not take referral compensation or a share of a provider's fee.
• Insurance-paid care untouched. Medical expenses paid through health insurance, Medicare, Medi-Cal or workers' compensation are not affected.
• Rideshare safety. Companies must run criminal background checks before activating a driver and annually after that; the list of disqualifying offenses grows, and the Senate Judiciary background paper describes an option for women riders and drivers to request same-gender matches.

Issue	Uber Initiative 25-0022	SB 623 as enacted
Legal form	Constitutional amendment	Statute (Chapter 17, Statutes of 2026)
Cases covered	All motor vehicle accidents	Rideshare (TNC) accidents only
Contingency fees	Capped at 25% including costs	No cap
Medical damages	Benchmark-rate limits, lien restrictions	Lien-based care limited to 70th percentile FAIR Health; lien-sale recovery limited to purchase price
Driver screening	Not the focus	Pre-activation and annual criminal checks; more disqualifying offenses
Status	Withdrawn from November 2026 ballot	Signed June 25, 2026; applies from Jan. 1, 2027

When does SB 623 take effect?

SB 623 applies to covered rideshare accidents that occur on or after January 1, 2027. Governor Newsom signed it and it was chaptered on June 25, 2026, the date both campaigns had set as the deadline for withdrawing their initiatives. Claims arising from crashes before 2027 are governed by existing California damages law, so firms will run two sets of rules on rideshare inventory for several years.

Did Uber's 25% contingency fee cap make the November 2026 ballot?

No. Uber's 25 percent contingency fee cap did not make the November 3, 2026 ballot. Uber withdrew Initiative 25-0022 and CAOC withdrew its rideshare-safety measure after SB 623 was signed, and neither appears on the Secretary of State's list of measures certified for November. The fee cap was dropped entirely in the compromise.

The precedent: MICRA in 2022

The 2026 deal followed a template both sides already knew. In 2022, a trial-lawyer-backed initiative, the Fairness for Injured Patients Act, would have effectively removed the $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases that had stood since 1975 under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act. CAOC and Californians Allied for Patient Protection, the medical coalition, negotiated AB 35 instead, and the initiative was withdrawn once the bill was signed.

AB 35 set new caps starting in 2023 at $350,000 for injury claims and $500,000 for wrongful death, rising by $40,000 and $50,000 a year respectively for ten years and by 2 percent a year after that. The lesson each side took from 2022 is visible in 2026: a funded, qualified ballot measure is worth more as leverage than as a campaign, and the Legislature will ratify a negotiated settlement to keep a costly fight off the ballot. In 2022 the trial bar was the aggressor; in 2026 it was the target. The war chest is an attempt to make sure it negotiates from strength either way.

Fault lines inside the plaintiffs' bar

The Daily Journal account of divisions over who paid in is a reminder that a trade association's political fund is a collective-action problem. Every personal injury firm in California benefits from defeating a contingency fee cap; only some of them paid for it. The report describes campaign finance records being used to identify who contributed, and at least one prominent trial lawyer objecting to non-contributors and attorneys facing ethics complaints receiving convention platforms.

That friction intersects with other pressure on high-volume practices. California's SB 37 now lets private plaintiffs sue over unlawful attorney advertising and referral operations. Uber and other companies have filed civil RICO suits against personal injury firms and medical providers in several states. And SB 623's own referral and lien rules are aimed squarely at the lien-based treatment model associated with some volume auto practices. A standing fund that is financed disproportionately by trial-focused firms, while volume firms face separate regulatory heat, invites argument about whose interests the fund will defend.

Could tort reform come back to the California ballot?

Yes. Nothing in SB 623 bars Uber, insurers or any other group from filing a new tort reform initiative for a future election, and the trial bar's decision to keep a war chest reflects an expectation that one will come. California's initiative process lets any proponent file a measure with the Attorney General, circulate it and qualify it with enough signatures.

Three features of the 2026 outcome make a rerun plausible. Uber obtained lien and medical-damages limits only for rideshare crashes, while its initiative had targeted all motor vehicle cases; a sponsor seeking statewide auto-case limits has an unfinished agenda. The contingency fee cap, Uber's headline proposal, was dropped rather than resolved. And the defense side now has a working model: fund an initiative heavily enough to force a deal. The bar's response is the reserve fund, which is meant to make that model more expensive to run.

What it means for PI firms, rideshare defendants, funders and providers

Personal injury firms. Expect continued solicitation for political contributions and greater attention to who has paid in, since filings are public. Rideshare cases arising from crashes on or after January 1, 2027 will need different damages work-ups where clients treat on a lien basis, and intake and referral practices should be reviewed against SB 623's ownership and referral restrictions.

Rideshare companies and insurers. SB 623 delivers medical-damages limits in rideshare cases from 2027 and stricter background-check obligations now in statute. Any attempt to extend similar limits to all auto cases will face an opponent with tens of millions of dollars already raised.

Litigation funders and lien purchasers. Recovery on a sold medical lien in a covered rideshare case is limited to its purchase price, and the transaction is discoverable. Funders and factoring companies that price lien portfolios on billed charges will need to discount covered rideshare receivables. That sits alongside California's separate rules on Third-Party Litigation Funding control under AB 2305.

Lien-based medical providers. The 70th percentile FAIR Health benchmark becomes the practical ceiling on what a plaintiff can recover for their care in covered cases, which will shape what providers can expect to collect when a case resolves.

Advocates elsewhere. Trial lawyer associations in other states facing well-funded tort reform drives now have a California data point: matching an opponent's war chest can convert an initiative fight into a negotiated statute with narrower scope than the measure it replaced.

FAQ

How much money do California trial lawyers have left after the Uber deal?

Less than $30 million, according to the Daily Journal's October 18, 2026 reading of campaign finance records. CAOC and allied committees raised about $80 million and spent at least $48 million in 2026.

Why are California plaintiffs' lawyers keeping a political war chest?

To deter future tort reform ballot initiatives. CAOC's PAC leadership argues that a standing fund lets the bar respond immediately to the next measure instead of raising money from scratch.

What does SB 623 do?

SB 623 limits recoveries for lien-based medical care in rideshare crash cases to a 70th percentile FAIR Health benchmark, limits recovery on sold medical liens to their purchase price, restricts lawyer-provider referral ties, and requires annual rideshare driver background checks. It does not cap contingency fees.

When does SB 623 take effect?

It applies to rideshare accidents occurring on or after January 1, 2027. It was signed and chaptered on June 25, 2026.

Did Uber's 25% contingency fee cap make the ballot?

No. Uber withdrew Initiative 25-0022 after SB 623 was signed, and the fee cap was not part of the compromise.

Who funded the California trial lawyers' ballot campaign?

More than 1,000 contributors, according to spring 2026 reporting, with the largest single contribution being $30 million from the CAOC Initiative Defense PAC to the Alliance Against Corporate Abuse committee, according to the FPPC.