Lululemon Arbitration Appeal: Ninth Circuit Presses Retailer on Warehouse Pickers and the FAA Exemption
At the Lululemon arbitration appeal argued November 17, 2026, a Ninth Circuit panel pushed back on the claim that a warehouse picker is not a transportation worker under FAA Section 1. A loss would keep a proposed wage class in court, and California's AB 2155 closes the state-law escape route from January 1, 2027.
Courts Desk··17 min read

The Lululemon arbitration appeal is a test of whether a warehouse worker who picks merchandise off shelves is a "transportation worker" exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act, and at oral argument on Tuesday, November 17, 2026, a Ninth Circuit panel sounded skeptical of Lululemon's answer. If the court affirms the October 2025 denial of the companies' motion to compel arbitration in Berdugo v. Lululemon USA, Inc., No. 25-7124, a proposed California wage class action against Lululemon USA Inc. and Logic Staffing LLC stays in federal court rather than splitting into individual arbitrations.
The case matters beyond one distribution center. Lululemon is asking the court to draw a line inside the warehouse, between workers who load and unload interstate freight and workers who pick and pack orders from storage. The Ninth Circuit has already held, in Ortiz v. Randstad Inhouse Services, that a warehouse worker who moved goods within a facility was exempt. The Supreme Court widened the exemption again in May 2026 in Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock. And California's legislature has decided that, starting January 1, 2027, an employer that loses the federal argument cannot fall back on the California Arbitration Act. Those three developments together make the Lululemon arbitration appeal one of the more consequential pending Section 1 cases for retailers and logistics employers that rely on individual arbitration and class action waivers.
What is the Lululemon arbitration appeal about?
Alma Berdugo, a former warehouse worker, sued Lululemon USA Inc. and Logic Staffing LLC on August 28, 2025, in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, No. 5:25-cv-02252. Her proposed class action alleges violations of California labor law covering wages, overtime, meal and rest breaks, and reimbursement of work expenses. Logic Staffing is a staffing company; the complaint pairs it with Lululemon, the business whose merchandise Berdugo handled, a common structure in California warehouse litigation.
The companies moved to compel individual arbitration and dismiss the case. Berdugo opposed, arguing that her job put her within Section 1 of the FAA, which excludes from the statute "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." On October 30, 2025, U.S. District Judge Sunshine Sykes granted the defendants' request for judicial notice but denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding that Berdugo's employment fell within the federal exemption. The companies took an immediate appeal under FAA Section 16(a), which the Ninth Circuit docketed as No. 25-7124.
On appeal, Lululemon and Logic Staffing make two arguments, according to reports of the briefing and argument. First, they say Berdugo's work picking items off warehouse shelves did not play a "direct and necessary role" in moving goods in interstate or foreign commerce, so she is outside the exemption as a matter of law. Second, they argue that Judge Sykes should have held an evidentiary hearing to resolve disputes over what Berdugo actually did before ruling on the exemption. Berdugo's position is that handling merchandise as it moves through the distribution process is exactly the kind of work the Ninth Circuit found exempt in Ortiz.
Timeline of Berdugo v. Lululemon
| Date | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Aug. 28, 2025 | Complaint filed, C.D. Cal. No. 5:25-cv-02252 | District court docket |
| Oct. 30, 2025 | Judge Sykes grants judicial notice request, denies motion to compel arbitration | District court docket |
| Late 2025 | Notice of appeal; Ninth Circuit docket No. 25-7124 opened | Appellate docket |
| May 28, 2026 | Supreme Court decides Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock, 9-0 | Supreme Court opinion |
| June 30, 2026 | Governor signs AB 2155 amending Code of Civil Procedure section 1281 | California bill text |
| Oct. 29, 2026 | Ninth Circuit hears a separate warehouse-worker exemption appeal, Rodriguez v. HV Global Group | Law360 |
| Nov. 17, 2026 | Ninth Circuit hears argument in Berdugo; panel presses Lululemon | Law360; Law Commentary |
| Jan. 1, 2027 | AB 2155 takes effect | California bill text |
What did the Ninth Circuit judges ask Lululemon at oral argument?
The panel questioned Lululemon's core premise: that shelf-picking is too far removed from interstate transportation to count. Coverage of the hearing describes the judges challenging the companies' position that Berdugo's responsibilities were insufficiently connected to interstate commerce, and the court took the case under submission without ruling from the bench. Reports did not identify the members of the panel, and no transcript or written order was publicly available at the time of writing, so the specific exchanges are not quoted here.
The direction of the questioning fits the court's recent pattern. On October 29, 2026, a different Ninth Circuit panel hearing Rodriguez v. HV Global Group, another appeal over whether a proposed class of warehouse workers is exempt, appeared similarly skeptical of the employer's argument, and reports tied that skepticism to the court's earlier holding in Ortiz. Two panels in three weeks pushing back on the same employer theory suggests the Ortiz framework is not under serious internal pressure.
Are warehouse workers exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act?
Some are, and in the Ninth Circuit the answer depends on what the class of workers typically does with goods that are still moving interstate, not on job titles or the employer's industry. Under Ortiz v. Randstad Inhouse Services, LLC, 95 F.4th 1152 (9th Cir. 2024), a warehouse worker who handled goods as they entered a facility, were stored, and left it was exempt, because those steps were part of the goods' continuing interstate journey to their final destination. The court expressly rejected the argument that moving products a short distance across a warehouse floor and onto storage racks was too minor to count.
The modern test comes from four Supreme Court decisions.
- Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (2001) confined the Section 1 residual clause to transportation workers, leaving most employment arbitration agreements under the FAA.
- New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira (2019) held that "contracts of employment" includes independent contractor agreements and that a court must decide whether Section 1 applies before it can compel arbitration under the Act.
- Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon (2022) set a two-step test: define the relevant "class of workers" by the work they actually perform, then ask whether that class is "engaged in foreign or interstate commerce," which requires at least a direct and necessary role in the free flow of goods across borders. The Court held that a ramp supervisor who loaded cargo onto airplanes qualified.
- Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC (2024) unanimously rejected any requirement that the worker's employer be in the transportation industry.
Then came Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock, No. 24-935, decided May 28, 2026. In a unanimous opinion by Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Court rejected Flowers Foods' proposed bright-line rule that a worker can never qualify unless the worker crosses state lines or interacts with vehicles that do. A worker who transports goods on an intrastate leg of an interstate journey can be exempt. The Court left several issues open, including whether a distributor agreement is a "contract of employment" and whether passing title to a distributor can break the interstate journey.
Does picking items off warehouse shelves count as transportation work?
That is the precise question the Lululemon arbitration appeal asks, and no published Ninth Circuit opinion has yet answered it for pickers specifically. Ortiz involved a worker whose duties ran from receiving to storage to outbound movement, and the opinion assumed he did not unload shipping containers or load trucks. Lululemon's argument is that picking orders from storage is different in kind: the worker selects items for a customer order rather than moving freight through the facility, so the work is about fulfillment, not transportation.
There are three reasons that distinction may be hard to sustain after the November 17 argument.
First, Ortiz already rejected a distance-based limit. If moving goods a few yards onto racks is sufficiently connected to interstate commerce, moving the same goods a few yards off the racks toward the outbound dock is difficult to distinguish on the same reasoning. Both steps sit between the inbound interstate shipment and the outbound delivery.
Second, Flowers Foods moved the focus to the worker's role in the journey. The Supreme Court asked whether a worker plays a direct and necessary role in an interstate journey of goods even if that role is confined to one state. A picker who prepares merchandise for shipment to a customer, when that merchandise arrived from out of state and has not yet reached its destination, arguably performs a necessary step in the journey. The question the defendants must win is whether the goods have "come to rest" at the warehouse, so that picking begins a new, separate trip.
Third, Saxon looks at the class, not the individual. The test defines the class by the work its members typically perform. Lululemon can still argue that pickers as a class are order-fulfillment staff rather than freight handlers, and the Tenth Circuit's September 2026 decision in Joyner v. Frontier Airlines shows courts will remand when the class was defined too loosely. But that argument depends on a factual record, which leads to the companies' second issue.
How the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court have ruled on in-facility and short-haul work
| Case | Court and date | Workers | Left the facility? | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rittmann v. Amazon.com | 9th Cir., 2020 | Amazon Flex last-mile drivers | Yes, local roads | Exempt |
| Southwest Airlines v. Saxon | U.S. Supreme Court, 2022 | Ramp supervisor loading cargo | No | Exempt |
| Lopez v. Cintas | 5th Cir., 2022 | Local driver after goods reached warehouse | Yes, local roads | Not exempt (contrary view) |
| Ortiz v. Randstad | 9th Cir., Mar. 12, 2024 | Staffing-agency warehouse worker moving goods | No | Exempt; cert denied Oct. 7, 2024 |
| Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries | U.S. Supreme Court, 2024 | Bakery distributors | Yes | No transportation-industry requirement |
| Flowers Foods v. Brock | U.S. Supreme Court, May 28, 2026 | Intrastate bakery distributor | Yes, intrastate | Exempt; bright-line rule rejected |
| Joyner v. Frontier Airlines | 10th Cir., Sept. 2026 | Airport agents | No | Remanded to define class by typical duties |
| McClusky v. Domino's Pizza | W.D. Wash., Nov. 16, 2026 | Warehouse yard driver | Reported as on-site | Exempt; motion to compel denied |
| Berdugo v. Lululemon | 9th Cir., argued Nov. 17, 2026 | Warehouse picker (staffing-agency arrangement) | No | Pending |
The evidentiary-hearing argument: Lululemon's better path?
The companies' alternative request, a remand for an evidentiary hearing on Berdugo's actual duties, may be the more realistic outcome for them. Section 4 of the FAA directs a court to "proceed summarily to the trial" of disputes about the making of an arbitration agreement, and courts generally treat a motion to compel like a summary judgment motion: if material facts are genuinely disputed, the court should not resolve them on conflicting declarations alone.
Applied to Section 1, the logic runs like this. Saxon says the class is defined by the work its members actually perform. If the employer's declarations describe pickers as order-fulfillment staff who never touch inbound or outbound freight, and the worker's declaration describes moving pallets from receiving and staging outbound shipments, the record does not establish which description fits the class. A remand would let both sides develop that record, and possibly take limited discovery on facility operations.
For Berdugo, a remand is a partial loss of time rather than of the case. For the companies, it would reopen the possibility of carving pickers out of the exemption on a fuller record. The panel's reported skepticism on the merits does not reveal how it views the procedural point, and that question may decide the practical outcome.
Logic Staffing and the staffing-agency layer
The staffing structure is not incidental. Ortiz itself was a staffing-agency case, brought against Randstad Inhouse Services, and the Section 1 analysis did not change because the worker was placed by an agency rather than hired directly. Bissonnette reinforces the point: if the employer need not be a transportation company, it does not matter that the formal employer is a staffing firm whose business is supplying labor.
Staffing arrangements matter more on the state-law side. California courts have been skeptical of attempts by host employers to enforce an agency's arbitration agreement when the worker's claims rest on the host's own conduct, and in October 2026 a California Court of Appeal panel refused to let a staffing agency compel arbitration of a warehouse worker's wage claims, reasoning that arbitration could produce conflicting rulings with claims by other workers at the same warehouse. That reasoning tracks Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2(c), the third-party litigation exception available under the California Arbitration Act but not under the FAA. For any California staffing defendant that loses the federal exemption fight, state procedure offers fewer tools, not more.
What happens to the Berdugo lawsuit if Lululemon loses the appeal?
If the Ninth Circuit affirms, the denial of the motion to compel arbitration stands and the case returns to Judge Sykes as a proposed class action in federal court. The companies could seek rehearing en banc or file a petition for certiorari, but the Supreme Court declined to review Ortiz in October 2024, and Flowers Foods moved the law in the workers' direction, not the employers'.
An affirmance removes the FAA, not the arbitration agreement itself. In other states, employers that lose a Section 1 fight sometimes try to enforce the same agreement under a state arbitration statute. In California, that fallback is narrow and about to get narrower.
Can California employers compel arbitration under state law if the FAA does not apply?
Only in limited circumstances, and California Labor Code section 229 is the main obstacle. Section 229 provides that actions to collect due and unpaid wages may be maintained without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate. In Perry v. Thomas (1987), the Supreme Court held that the FAA preempts section 229 where the FAA applies. When a worker is exempt under Section 1, that preemption disappears. California courts applied this reasoning to exempt drivers in Muller v. Roy Miller Freight Lines (2019), and the First District reportedly applied it in Doss v. Tesla (June 11, 2026) to hold an arbitration agreement ineffective as to most of a yard hostler's overtime and meal-and-rest claims.
For Berdugo, whose claims center on wages, overtime and breaks, section 229 means that even a successful state-law motion would leave much of the case in court. Expense reimbursement claims and any Private Attorneys General Act claims would raise their own questions, but the core wage claims would likely be litigated, not arbitrated.
How does AB 2155 change arbitration for California warehouse workers?
AB 2155, signed June 30, 2026 and effective January 1, 2027, adds a new subdivision to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281 providing that a written arbitration agreement is not enforceable under that section to the extent it is not enforceable under the FAA. In practical terms, California imports the FAA's own exclusions, including the Section 1 transportation worker exemption and the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act, into state arbitration law. Before AB 2155, an employer that lost the federal argument could at least try the California Arbitration Act; after it takes effect, a worker exempt under Section 1 is outside both statutes.
Whether AB 2155 reaches cases like Berdugo, filed in 2025 under an agreement signed earlier, is an open question of retroactivity that the bill text does not resolve on its face and that courts will have to settle. It plainly governs motions brought in new cases from January 1, 2027. Either way, the direction is clear: in California, the Section 1 analysis is becoming the whole ballgame for warehouse arbitration programs.
When will the Ninth Circuit decide Berdugo v. Lululemon?
There is no deadline. The Ninth Circuit issues unpublished memorandum dispositions in some cases within weeks of argument and takes months for published opinions. Because Berdugo raises a question Ortiz did not squarely answer, whether pickers fall within the exemption, a published opinion is plausible, and a decision in the first half of 2027 would be within the court's normal range. The court could also coordinate timing with Rodriguez v. HV Global Group, argued three weeks earlier on overlapping issues.
Meanwhile the district court case is on hold. Under Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski (2023), a non-frivolous appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration automatically stays district court proceedings. Berdugo has been frozen at the pleadings stage since late 2025, more than a year between the denial and the argument. That delay is part of the value of an appeal to a defendant even when the merits are uphill, and it is a cost plaintiffs' counsel must budget for in any Section 1 case.
Possible outcomes at a glance
| Ninth Circuit outcome | What happens next | Practical effect |
|---|---|---|
| Affirm (pickers exempt or record sufficient) | Case returns to Judge Sykes; class discovery and certification proceed | Section 229 keeps wage claims in court; AB 2155 blocks state-law fallback in new cases |
| Reverse (pickers not exempt as a matter of law) | Individual arbitration compelled; class claims likely barred by waiver | Narrows Ortiz to inbound/outbound freight handlers |
| Vacate and remand for evidentiary hearing | Factual record on typical picker duties; limited discovery possible | Months of delay; outcome turns on facility-specific evidence |
What the Lululemon arbitration appeal means for employers, workers' counsel and drafters
What it means for retailers and logistics employers
The Lululemon arbitration appeal shows that a defense built on job-title distinctions inside the warehouse is fighting precedent that runs the other way. Retailers that operate or contract for distribution centers receiving out-of-state goods should assume many floor workers, including receivers, stockers and potentially pickers, may be exempt, and that in California neither the FAA nor, from January 1, 2027, the California Arbitration Act will enforce individual arbitration for them. The defense evidence that matters is granular: which roles touch inbound or outbound interstate freight, how often, and whether goods are repackaged or transformed before shipment.
What it means for plaintiffs' employment counsel
For workers' counsel, the case confirms the value of building the factual record early. Detailed declarations about pallet movement, staging, and loading help defeat an employer's request for an evidentiary hearing or survive one. Counsel should expect defendants to frame the class narrowly under Saxon and Joyner, and should be ready to show what the class of workers typically does, not just the named plaintiff. In California, pairing the Section 1 argument with section 229 for wage claims gives a second, independent route to keeping the case in court.
What it means for arbitration clause drafters
Drafters for multistate employers face a narrowing menu. An FAA-only agreement is unenforceable against exempt workers. A state-law fallback clause still helps in some states, but in California AB 2155 neutralizes it for agreements the FAA will not enforce. Employers with California warehouse workforces should review whether their agreements include a severability clause and a clear statement of what happens to a class action waiver if arbitration is unavailable, and whether a blow-up provision that sends class claims to court is preferable to years of satellite litigation.
What it means for mass arbitration strategy
Section 1 also reshapes Mass Arbitration risk. Logistics and retail employers that require individual arbitration of wage claims face coordinated mass filings by hundreds or thousands of workers, each carrying employer-paid fees; AAA data for 2024 included a single employment filing of roughly 30,000 demands. For exempt workers, that pressure moves back to court as a conventional Class Action. Claimants' firms sizing warehouse campaigns now need a role-by-role Section 1 analysis before choosing between individual demands and a Rule 23 class, and employers deciding whether to defend arbitration programs on appeal should weigh the Coinbase stay against the risk of a published opinion that broadens Ortiz.
FAQ
What is the Lululemon arbitration appeal about?
It is Lululemon USA Inc. and Logic Staffing LLC's appeal, No. 25-7124, from a Central District of California order refusing to send warehouse worker Alma Berdugo's proposed wage class action to individual arbitration because she is an exempt transportation worker under Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act.
Are warehouse workers exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act?
In the Ninth Circuit, warehouse workers who handle goods that are still on an interstate journey can be exempt under Ortiz v. Randstad Inhouse Services (2024), and the Supreme Court's 2026 decision in Flowers Foods v. Brock confirms that a worker need not cross state lines to qualify.
Does picking items off warehouse shelves count as transportation work?
That is undecided at the appellate level and is the central issue in Berdugo; Lululemon argues picking is order fulfillment without a direct and necessary role in interstate transportation, while the worker argues it is a necessary step in moving goods through the distribution chain.
What happens if Lululemon loses the appeal?
The case returns to the district court as a proposed class action, and in California, Labor Code section 229 allows the wage claims to proceed in court despite the arbitration agreement once the FAA no longer applies.
How does AB 2155 change arbitration for California warehouse workers?
From January 1, 2027, AB 2155 makes an arbitration agreement unenforceable under the California Arbitration Act to the extent the FAA would not enforce it, so workers exempt under Section 1 can no longer be compelled to arbitrate under state law instead.
When will the Ninth Circuit decide Berdugo v. Lululemon?
The court has no deadline; the case was submitted after argument on November 17, 2026, and a published opinion would most likely arrive in the first half of 2027, while the district court case remains stayed under Coinbase v. Bielski.
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