$7.5 Million Childbirth Death Verdict Against Advocate Upheld: No Unanimity Needed on Which Act Was Negligent
On November 13, 2026, an Illinois appellate court affirmed a $7.5 million childbirth death verdict against Advocate Illinois Masonic, holding that jurors must agree a defendant was negligent but not on which specific failure in care caused the death.
Courts Desk··13 min read

An Illinois appellate court on Friday, November 13, 2026, affirmed a $7.5 million childbirth death verdict against Advocate Illinois Masonic Medical Center, an obstetrician and a labor and delivery nurse, holding that civil jurors must unanimously find that a defendant's negligence caused the death but do not have to agree on which specific lapse in care was negligent. The published opinion in Flores v. Advocate Health and Hospitals Corp., 2026 IL App (1st) 252198, keeps intact a judgment that, with $1,613,835.61 in prejudgment interest, exceeds $9.1 million, and it hardens a rule that makes multi-theory medical malpractice verdicts in Illinois much harder to attack on appeal.
The decision, written by Justice Wilson for the First District's Fifth Division, is the second Advocate appeal in under three years to fail on the same argument. In 2024, the First District rejected a near-identical unanimity challenge to a $45.3 million verdict in Galich v. Advocate Health and Hospital Corp. Flores turns that ruling from a single data point into a line of authority, and it arrives in the same year the Illinois Supreme Court, in Schilling v. Quincy Physicians & Surgeons Clinic, gave trial judges wide latitude to manage divided juries without declaring a mistrial. For hospital systems, their insurers and the Chicago plaintiffs' bar, the $7.5 million childbirth death verdict is now less a fact-specific win than a template.
What did the Illinois appeals court decide in Flores v. Advocate?
The court affirmed the Cook County judgment in full. The core holding, as reported by Law360 and reflected in the opinion, is that Illinois law requires unanimity on the ultimate finding (that a defendant was negligent and that the negligence proximately caused the injury) rather than on the particular act or omission that constituted the breach. Where a plaintiff presents several alternative ways in which a nurse or physician fell below the standard of care, some jurors may rest on one deviation and others on another, so long as all twelve agree the defendant was negligent and that the negligence caused the death.
The defendants had argued that the verdict was invalid because the jury was never required to agree on the same specific act of negligence. The appellate court rejected that position. The opinion also addressed the defendants' related complaint about how the verdict form and special interrogatories handled the plaintiffs' alternative theories against the nurse, and found no reversible error. Because the opinion was filed as a published opinion rather than a nonprecedential order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23, it binds trial courts across the state unless another district disagrees.
How much was the Advocate Illinois Masonic childbirth death verdict?
The jury awarded $7.5 million in wrongful-death damages after a three-week trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County. The trial court's judgment added $1,613,835.61 in prejudgment interest, bringing the total to roughly $9.11 million before post-judgment interest. Illinois imposes no statutory cap on compensatory damages in medical malpractice cases; the Illinois Supreme Court struck the last cap down in Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital in 2010.
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Case | Flores v. Advocate Health and Hospitals Corp., 2026 IL App (1st) 252198 |
| Appellate docket | No. 1-25-2198 |
| Court | Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fifth Division |
| Opinion filed | November 13, 2026 (published opinion) |
| Author | Justice Wilson |
| Trial court | Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 2020 L 010272 |
| Plaintiffs | Jeryis Flores, individually and as independent administrator of the estate of Cianie Flores, and Carlos Flores |
| Defendants on appeal | Advocate Health and Hospitals Corp.; Advocate North Side Health Network d/b/a Advocate Illinois Masonic Medical Center; Dr. Silvia Bicalho; nurse Josephine Jimenez |
| Verdict | $7.5 million (wrongful death), after a three-week jury trial |
| Prejudgment interest | $1,613,835.61 under 735 ILCS 5/2-1303(c) |
| Total judgment | About $9.11 million |
| Result | Affirmed |
The facts behind the birth injury verdict
Cianie Flores died during childbirth at Advocate Illinois Masonic, on Chicago's North Side, in 2018. According to a summary of the trial published by Chicago birth injury attorney Robert Kreisman, her mother arrived at the hospital in her 39th week of pregnancy, and the baby was delivered by emergency cesarean section roughly eight hours later. Despite resuscitation efforts, the baby did not survive. The family alleged that the defendants ignored clear warning signs of fetal distress on the monitoring strip and failed to intervene in time.
The plaintiffs' case against the labor and delivery nurse was built on more than one theory. The opinion describes allegations that nurse Josephine Jimenez failed to advocate for the placement of a fetal scalp electrode, an internal monitor that gives a more reliable fetal heart rate tracing than an external belt monitor, and that she failed to use the chain of command, the hospital escalation process by which a nurse who disagrees with a physician's plan takes the concern to a charge nurse, a supervisor or another physician. A plaintiffs' nursing expert testified that Jimenez deviated from the standard of care. The claims against obstetrician Dr. Silvia Bicalho centered on the timing of intervention, including whether internal monitoring should have been used earlier and whether a cesarean should have been undertaken sooner. Advocate faced liability both directly and vicariously for its employees.
The Kreisman summary identifies Clark Raymond and Robert Raymond as the family's trial counsel. The trial-court caption, Flores v. Vijayakumar, names a lead defendant who is not among the appellants in the published opinion.
Do jurors have to agree on the specific act of negligence in Illinois?
No. Under Flores and Galich, Illinois civil jurors must unanimously agree that the defendant was negligent and that the negligence proximately caused the plaintiff's injury, but they need not agree on which of several alleged negligent acts was the breach. The unanimity requirement attaches to the elements of the claim (duty, breach, causation, damages), not to the evidentiary route each juror takes to find breach.
The reasoning tracks how negligence is pleaded and instructed in Illinois. A medical negligence count typically alleges that the defendant was "careless and negligent in one or more of the following respects" and then lists subparagraphs: failed to place a fetal scalp electrode, failed to escalate, failed to call for a cesarean, and so on. The Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions tell the jury that the plaintiff must prove the defendant acted or failed to act in one of the ways claimed and that the conduct was a proximate cause of the injury. Each subparagraph is a way of proving one element, breach, rather than a separate claim. Reading the instructions to require twelve votes on each subparagraph would turn a single negligence count into a set of mini-claims, something neither the pattern instructions nor the general verdict form contemplates.
Defendants have long drawn on criminal law, where the U.S. Supreme Court in Ramos v. Louisiana (2020) held that the Sixth Amendment requires unanimous verdicts in state felony trials. The First District in Galich treated the criminal unanimity cases as distinguishable and not controlling in civil negligence cases, and Flores follows that path. Even in criminal law, the Supreme Court's plurality in Schad v. Arizona (1991) recognized that jurors need not agree on the preliminary factual means by which an element is satisfied.
Why did Advocate appeal the $7.5 million verdict?
The defendants' central argument was that the verdict could not stand because the jury was never required to agree, as a body, on which act of negligence it was relying on. That matters most where the plaintiff stacks several theories against one defendant. If six jurors believed the nurse should have pushed for a scalp electrode, and the other six believed she should have gone up the chain of command, the defendants contended there was no unanimous finding of any one negligent act.
The second strand of the appeal concerned special interrogatories. The verdict form in Flores carried six special interrogatories, and the opinion discusses whether the jury was properly asked to find unanimously on the theories against the nurse. The opinion notes that the defendants did not tender a special interrogatory addressing nurse Jimenez's alleged failure to question a physician's decision. That omission matters because Illinois treats a special interrogatory as the device for testing a general verdict; a party that does not ask for a specific finding generally cannot complain on appeal that the jury never made it.
What is a special interrogatory, and why did it decide Flores?
A special interrogatory is a written question the jury answers alongside its general verdict, usually yes or no, on a single material question of fact. In Illinois it is governed by Section 2-1108 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/2-1108. The statute makes the general verdict the default, but it requires the court to submit a proper special interrogatory on request of any party, and it provides that when a special finding is inconsistent with the general verdict, the special finding controls and the court may enter judgment accordingly. In Flores, the court restated the familiar principle that the purpose of a special interrogatory is to test the general verdict against the jury's findings on the ultimate facts.
That framework is why the unanimity argument kept failing. Illinois also follows the two-issue rule, applied in medical negligence cases such as Strino v. Premier Healthcare Associates (2006): when a jury returns a general verdict on multiple theories and the losing party did not request special interrogatories to separate them, the verdict will be upheld if any one theory is supported by the evidence. In Galich, the First District said that, given the jury's general verdict and Advocate's failure to request a special verdict, Advocate could not complain about how the jury divided over the alleged negligent acts. Flores applies the same logic: the defense could have asked the jury, theory by theory, whether it unanimously found the nurse negligent in a particular respect, and did not do so as to at least one of the plaintiffs' theories.
How does Flores relate to Galich v. Advocate?
Galich is the direct precedent, and Flores confirms and extends it. Galich, decided March 8, 2024, by the First District's Sixth Division, arose from a brain injury suffered by Steven Butts after a botched endotracheal tube placement. The jury awarded $45.3 million, and the judgment added about $2.8 million in prejudgment interest. During deliberations, jurors sent notes indicating they agreed the physician was negligent but were split on which of the alleged acts amounted to negligence. The trial judge answered: "You must make a unanimous decision that Dr. Joo was negligent. You do not need to be unanimous as to which one of the *** possible acts constitute the negligence." The appellate court held that the answer correctly stated Illinois law and affirmed, also upholding the constitutionality of the prejudgment interest statute.
Galich came up through a mid-deliberation jury note. Flores applies the same rule to a verdict that already included special interrogatories, and it reaches a nurse defendant and a chain-of-command theory, the kind of systems-failure claim that features in almost every Illinois birth injury case. The 2026 Illinois Supreme Court decision in Schilling v. Quincy Physicians & Surgeons Clinic, which affirmed a defense verdict and held that a juror's "surrender" note during deliberations did not compel a mistrial, rounds out a three-case picture in which reviewing courts give substantial deference to how trial judges manage jury deliberations.
| Case | Court and date | Verdict | Deliberation issue | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Galich v. Advocate Health and Hospital Corp., 2024 IL App (1st) 230134 | First District, Sixth Division, Mar. 8, 2024 | $45.3M for plaintiff, plus about $2.8M prejudgment interest | Jury note: agreed on negligence, split on which act; judge said unanimity on the specific act not required | Affirmed |
| Schilling v. Quincy Physicians & Surgeons Clinic, 2026 IL 131411 | Illinois Supreme Court, Jan. 23, 2026 | Defense verdict | Juror "surrender" note; mistrial motion and Prim instruction | Affirmed |
| Flores v. Advocate Health and Hospitals Corp., 2026 IL App (1st) 252198 | First District, Fifth Division, Nov. 13, 2026 | $7.5M for plaintiffs, plus $1,613,835.61 prejudgment interest | Unanimity across alternative theories; adequacy of special interrogatories | Affirmed |
How much prejudgment interest was added, and how is it calculated?
The trial court added $1,613,835.61. Illinois' prejudgment interest statute, 735 ILCS 5/2-1303(c), effective July 1, 2021, requires interest at 6% per year on damages in personal injury and wrongful death actions, generally running from the date the action is filed. It does not apply to punitive damages, sanctions, statutory attorney's fees or statutory costs, it stops accruing after five years, and it can be reduced by a defendant's written settlement offers. Galich rejected a constitutional challenge to the statute. The Flores suit was filed in the Cook County Law Division in 2020 and reached judgment in 2025, so interest accrued for most of the statutory window; post-judgment interest continues to run while the case remains on appeal.
For defendants, the interest provision is part of why appeals of large medical negligence verdicts carry real cost. Each year a case spends between filing and judgment adds roughly 6% to the exposure, and a failed appeal adds post-judgment interest on top.
What does the Flores ruling mean for medical malpractice trials in Illinois?
What it means for hospital defense counsel
The defense playbook now has to be built at the jury instruction conference, not on appeal. If a defendant wants to know whether all twelve jurors agree on a particular theory, it must tender a special interrogatory on that theory under Section 2-1108, phrased as a single, ultimate question of fact that would control the general verdict if answered "no." Flores signals that an interrogatory that leaves out one of the plaintiff's theories leaves the general verdict standing on that theory. Defense lawyers also have to weigh the trade-off: a theory-by-theory interrogatory can split a jury that would otherwise reach a defense verdict, but it can also highlight the strongest plaintiff theory.
What it means for the plaintiffs' bar
Plaintiffs' trial lawyers can continue to plead and try medical negligence counts in the alternative, as long as each theory has expert support. A nurse case can rest on monitoring, advocacy and chain-of-command failures at once, and a jury that agrees on negligence but divides over the mechanism is not a hung jury. The ruling also strengthens settlement leverage in birth injury cases, where defense arguments about juror confusion over multiple theories are now weaker on appeal. A Contingency Fee practice that funds three-week trials gets more predictable appellate outcomes.
What it means for hospitals, insurers and risk managers
Chain-of-command theories against nurses are now harder to separate from the general verdict. Hospital systems that rely on nursing escalation policies should expect those policies to be the yardstick for nurse negligence at trial, and their professional liability carriers should treat the $7.5 million childbirth death verdict, plus about $1.6 million in interest, as a realistic benchmark for Cook County infant wrongful-death claims tried to verdict. Reserve-setting should also account for the interest statute's five-year accrual window.
Can Advocate appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court?
Yes, but review is discretionary. Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315, a party may file a petition for leave to appeal within 35 days after the appellate court's judgment, or after the appellate court denies a timely petition for rehearing, which under Rule 367 is due within 21 days. The Supreme Court grants a small share of petitions, typically where there is a conflict among the appellate districts or a question of general importance. With two published First District decisions now aligned and no reported conflict from another district, the defendants would have to frame the jury-unanimity question as one the Supreme Court itself has never squarely answered. Until the Supreme Court acts, Flores and Galich control Illinois trial courts.
Frequently asked questions
What is the Flores v. Advocate case about?
Flores v. Advocate Health and Hospitals Corp. is a wrongful-death medical malpractice case over the 2018 death of Cianie Flores during childbirth at Advocate Illinois Masonic Medical Center in Chicago. A Cook County jury awarded the family $7.5 million, and the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed on November 13, 2026.
Do all jurors have to agree on how a doctor or nurse was negligent?
Not in Illinois. All twelve jurors must agree that the defendant was negligent and that the negligence caused the injury, but they may rely on different alleged negligent acts to reach that conclusion, under Flores (2026) and Galich (2024).
Who were the defendants in the Advocate childbirth death verdict?
The defendants on appeal were Advocate Health and Hospitals Corp., Advocate North Side Health Network (doing business as Advocate Illinois Masonic Medical Center), obstetrician Dr. Silvia Bicalho and labor and delivery nurse Josephine Jimenez.
What were the nurse's alleged failures?
The plaintiffs alleged that nurse Jimenez failed to advocate for placing a fetal scalp electrode to monitor the baby's heart rate more accurately and failed to use the chain of command to escalate concerns about fetal distress.
Is the Flores ruling binding on other Illinois courts?
Yes. It was issued as a published opinion, not a nonprecedential Rule 23 order, so Illinois circuit courts must follow it unless the Illinois Supreme Court or a conflicting appellate decision says otherwise.
How long did the case take?
The death occurred in 2018, the lawsuit was filed in Cook County in 2020, the jury verdict came in 2025 after a three-week trial, and the appellate court affirmed on November 13, 2026, more than eight years after the death.
Published for legal professionals. Analysis and summaries only — not legal advice, and no attorney-client relationship is created by use of this site.
Read next

Vasectomy Malpractice Verdict: Pa. Superior Court Affirms $9.5M Brennen Award and $62K Discovery Sanctions
On October 26, 2026 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania upheld a $9.5 million Fayette County vasectomy malpractice verdict for a man who lost a testicle, and let stand roughly $62,000 in sanctions on the urology defendants and their trial counsel for producing the full medical record days before trial.
Torts Desk · 12 min

$24 Million Radiologist Verdict: Gross Negligence Finding Tests South Carolina's Malpractice Cap
A Columbia, South Carolina jury awarded $24 million, including $14,645,390 in wrongful death noneconomic damages, over a missed esophageal perforation and found the radiologist grossly negligent, the finding that can lift the state's malpractice cap.
Torts Desk · 12 min

Trooper Stroke Verdict Appeal: New Jersey Asks Court to Void $11.3M Award Over Good-Faith Immunity
On November 16, 2026, New Jersey asked an Appellate Division panel to vacate the $11.3 million trooper stroke verdict won by Cheryl Rhines, arguing the trooper deserved Tort Claims Act immunity. The appeal tests how far good-faith immunity protects officers who mistake a medical emergency for intoxication.
Torts Desk · 11 min