$164 Million Birth Injury Verdict: Georgia Jury Holds OB-GYN and Practice Liable After Third Trial
A Thomas County, Georgia jury on November 18, 2026 returned a $164,586,856 birth injury verdict against Dr. Joseph Novak and Shaw Center for Women's Health, including $150 million for pain and suffering, in a case that took three trials and eight years.
Torts Desk··19 min read

A Thomas County, Georgia jury on Wednesday, November 18, 2026 returned a $164,586,856 birth injury verdict for Charis and Ben Lirette, finding obstetrician-gynecologist Joseph S. Novak, M.D. and his employer, Shaw Center for Women's Health, P.C., liable for failing to recognize and respond to a placental abruption during the delivery of their son, Grayson, who was left with a permanent brain injury. The $164 million birth injury verdict, which includes $150 million for Grayson's pain and suffering, came on the case's third trial, more than eight years after the family sued in 2018, and the plaintiffs' lawyers say it is the largest medical malpractice verdict in Georgia history.
The award matters well beyond Thomasville. It is one of the first nine-figure medical malpractice verdicts tried under the anchoring limits that Georgia wrote into its 2025 tort reform law, Senate Bill 68. It lands in a state with no cap on noneconomic damages in malpractice cases, because the Supreme Court of Georgia struck down the last one in 2010. And it arrives after two mistrials, one of which a judge later set aside as improperly declared, which gives the defense an unusually complicated procedural record to work with on post-trial motions and appeal. Novak and the practice denied liability at trial, according to published reports.
How much was the $164 million birth injury verdict, and how does it break down?
The jury awarded $164,586,856 in total. According to the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, that figure is made up of $150 million for Grayson's pain and suffering, $13.4 million for his medical expenses and $1.1 million for his lost earning capacity. The three reported components add up to roughly $164.5 million; the remaining difference reflects rounding in the published figures, and the itemized verdict form has not been made public.
| Component (as reported) | Amount | Share of total | Category |
|---|---|---|---|
| Grayson's pain and suffering | $150,000,000 | about 91% | Noneconomic |
| Medical expenses | about $13,400,000 | about 8% | Economic |
| Lost earning capacity | about $1,100,000 | under 1% | Economic |
| Total verdict | $164,586,856 | 100% | Compensatory |
Three features of that structure stand out for practitioners.
- The award is overwhelmingly noneconomic. Roughly nine of every ten dollars is for pain and suffering, the category Georgia's 2025 tort reform targeted with new rules on how lawyers may argue a number to the jury, and the category that a remittitur motion most often attacks.
- The economic damages are comparatively modest. A $13.4 million medical figure for a child with a lifelong brain injury is consistent with a life care plan, and it is the part of the verdict hardest for the defense to attack once the jury accepted causation.
- No punitive damages were reported. None of the coverage describes a punitive damages finding. The verdict appears to be entirely compensatory, which matters for appeal because compensatory awards in Georgia are reviewed under a different, more deferential lens than punitive awards.
Reports do not say whether the jury apportioned fault between Dr. Novak and Shaw Center, or whether Charis and Ben Lirette received separate awards for their own claims. Those details will appear in the judgment.
What did the jury find in the Lirette case?
The jury found that Dr. Novak and Shaw Center for Women's Health failed to recognize and appropriately respond to Charis Lirette's ongoing placental abruption, and that the failure caused Grayson's permanent brain injury. Grayson was born with severe hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy, a brain injury caused by a lack of oxygen around the time of birth, according to the AJC.
The family's theory, as reported, was that the medical team did not adequately monitor Charis Lirette's condition and delayed acting on evidence that Grayson was losing oxygen in the hours before he was born. That is a classic labor-and-delivery negligence theory: the injury itself is not alleged to have been caused by the physician, but the outcome is alleged to have been made far worse by a failure to recognize a deteriorating situation and deliver the baby in time.
The defendants denied wrongdoing. Neither the AJC nor the Times-Enterprise reported the specific defense theory, but in placental abruption cases the defense commonly argues that the abruption was sudden and catastrophic, that the injury occurred before any intervention could have prevented it, or that the warning signs were ambiguous. The jury's verdict means it rejected whatever causation and standard-of-care defense was presented in Thomas County.
The co-lead trial counsel for the Lirettes were Nelson Tyrone and Adam Malone. Counsel told the AJC that the parents testified and that jurors understood the lifelong needs Grayson will have because of his injuries. Grayson is now 9 years old.
What is placental abruption, and how can it cause a birth injury?
Placental abruption is an obstetric emergency in which the placenta separates from the wall of the uterus before the baby is delivered. Because the placenta is the fetus's only source of oxygen, a partial or complete separation can rapidly cut off oxygen supply, and the longer delivery is delayed after a significant abruption, the greater the risk of hypoxic brain injury or death.
Clinically, an abruption may present with vaginal bleeding, abdominal or back pain, a tender or rigid uterus, frequent contractions, and changes on the electronic fetal heart monitor. The legal significance lies in that last item. In most birth injury cases built on an abruption, the dispute is not whether an abruption occurred but when it became recognizable on the tracing and at the bedside, and whether a reasonably careful obstetrician would have moved to an expedited delivery, typically an emergency cesarean section, sooner.
That is why birth injury trials of this type turn on expert interpretation of fetal monitoring strips, nursing notes and timing evidence, and why the damages are so large when liability is found. Hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy can result in lifelong cognitive and motor impairment, including cerebral palsy, and the medical expense component of a verdict is usually built on a life care plan projecting decades of care.
Why did the Lirette birth injury case go to trial three times?
The case went to trial three times because the first two trials ended in mistrials. The first trial, in 2023, ended in a mistrial after the jury deadlocked, according to court records cited by the AJC. The second trial, in 2025, was presided over by a different judge, who declared a mistrial before the jury could deliberate, based on remarks made during closing arguments.
That second mistrial ruling was later found to be improper and set aside by Thomas County Superior Court Judge Gregory Voyles, who presided over both the first trial and the third. The public reports do not identify which remarks prompted the 2025 mistrial, which side made them, or the reasoning Judge Voyles gave for setting the ruling aside. They also do not say why the case proceeded to a third trial rather than to a verdict on the second jury, which never deliberated.
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2018 | Charis and Ben Lirette file suit against Dr. Joseph Novak and Shaw Center for Women's Health in Thomas County |
| 2023 | First trial ends in a mistrial after the jury deadlocks; Judge Gregory Voyles presiding |
| April 21, 2025 | Gov. Brian Kemp signs SB 68, rewriting Georgia's rules on arguing noneconomic damages |
| 2025 | Second trial, before a different judge, ends in a mistrial declared before deliberations over closing-argument remarks |
| 2025-2026 | Judge Voyles finds the second mistrial ruling improper and sets it aside |
| November 18, 2026 | Third trial ends with a $164,586,856 verdict for the Lirettes |
The procedural history is more than a curiosity. A mistrial over closing argument, in a state that had just enacted new statutory limits on closing arguments about pain and suffering, invites the question of whether the 2025 dispute concerned the new rules. The available reporting does not answer that, and it would be speculation to assume it. What is clear is that eight years of litigation and three trials raise the litigation-cost stakes for both sides on any appeal or settlement discussion, and that the defense will scrutinize the third trial's closing arguments with particular care.
Is $164 million the largest medical malpractice verdict in Georgia history?
The Lirettes' co-lead counsel told the AJC they believe the $164 million birth injury verdict is the largest in any medical malpractice case in Georgia's history and the fourth-largest verdict in any birth injury case in the United States; that ranking is the lawyers' characterization and has not been independently confirmed. Against the publicly reported benchmarks, however, the claim appears well supported.
| Verdict | Year | Venue | Case type | Amount | Later history |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lirette v. Novak / Shaw Center | 2026 | Thomas County | Birth injury (placental abruption, HIE) | $164,586,856 | Post-trial stage |
| DeKalb County malpractice verdict | 2022 | DeKalb County | Medical malpractice | $77 million | Reported by the Daily Report as appearing to set a Georgia record |
| Buckelew stroke verdict | 2022 | Fulton County | Missed stroke, locked-in syndrome | $75 million | Affirmed by the Court of Appeals on March 10, 2025; Supreme Court of Georgia denied review |
| Gwinnett fetal monitoring verdict | Earlier | Gwinnett County | Birth injury (delayed monitoring response) | about $30.5 million | Reported verdict |
Measured against the 2022 DeKalb and Fulton verdicts, each in the mid-$70 million range and each described at the time as a possible state record, the Thomas County award is more than double. It is also notable for its venue. Large Georgia malpractice verdicts have historically come from metro Atlanta counties such as Fulton, DeKalb and Gwinnett; Thomas County is a largely rural South Georgia county near the Florida line. Defense lawyers and insurers who price Georgia risk by venue will notice that a nine-figure malpractice award came from outside the metro area.
A verdict is not a judgment, and a judgment is not a payment. The Fulton County $75 million award is the cleaner benchmark precisely because it survived appeal. Whether the Lirette verdict joins it depends on the post-trial motions discussed below.
Does Georgia cap damages in medical malpractice cases?
No. Georgia has no enforceable cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases. In Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. 731 (2010), the Supreme Court of Georgia unanimously held that the $350,000 cap on noneconomic damages enacted in the state's 2005 Tort Reform Act violated the Georgia Constitution's guarantee of the right to a jury trial, because it required courts to reduce a jury's noneconomic damages award that exceeded the statutory limit.
That decision is the single most important legal fact behind the size of the Lirette verdict. Had the 2005 cap survived, the $150 million pain-and-suffering award would have been reduced to a small fraction of that amount by operation of law. Instead, the jury's figure stands unless a court finds it excessive under ordinary standards.
The contrast with other states is sharp. California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act still limits noneconomic damages, though at higher levels after the 2022 amendments, and many states retain hard caps of a few hundred thousand dollars to roughly $1 million for malpractice noneconomic damages. Georgia's 2025 legislature, in passing SB 68, did not attempt to reinstate a cap, likely because Nestlehutt makes a statutory cap on jury-assessed damages constitutionally vulnerable in Georgia. Subsequent litigation has continued to test the boundaries of Nestlehutt, including in wrongful death malpractice claims, but the core holding remains controlling law.
Did Georgia's SB 68 tort reform affect the $164 million verdict?
SB 68 did not cap or reduce the Lirette verdict, but it governed how the plaintiffs' lawyers were allowed to argue the $150 million pain-and-suffering figure at the 2026 trial. Gov. Brian Kemp signed SB 68 on April 21, 2025, and its rewrite of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-184 applies to trials held after that date even when the underlying claim is older.
Under the amended statute, counsel may argue a dollar value for noneconomic damages only after the close of evidence, at the party's first opportunity to argue damages, and only if the figure is rationally related to the evidence of noneconomic damages; a different number cannot be introduced in the concluding argument. Enforcement runs through O.C.G.A. § 9-10-185, which requires the court, on objection, to rebuke counsel and instruct the jury, and allows a mistrial. As this site reported in its coverage of the Georgia anchoring law ruling in the Walmart slip-and-fall case, the Court of Appeals on October 29, 2026 ordered a new trial where counsel tied pain-and-suffering values to an expert's daily rate.
For the Lirette verdict, three SB 68 consequences follow.
- The closing argument is now an appellate target. Any number the plaintiffs' counsel argued for Grayson's pain and suffering had to be rooted in the trial evidence about his injury and lifelong limitations. If the defense preserved objections, the rational-relationship requirement gives it a specific statutory ground on appeal. The reporting does not say whether any objection was made.
- Bifurcation was available. SB 68 lets any party elect to try liability and damages separately under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-15. Whether either side made that election in the third trial has not been reported.
- The medical damages change does not apply. SB 68's provision letting juries consider amounts actually paid rather than billed for medical care applies only to causes of action arising on or after April 21, 2025. A claim filed in 2018 falls outside it, so the $13.4 million medical figure was not subject to the new rule.
SB 68 also left Georgia's no-cap regime untouched. The law regulates how a number is argued, not how large a number a jury may return.
Other Georgia rules that shape a birth injury verdict
Several older Georgia statutes bear directly on how a verdict like this one is tried, reviewed and ultimately collected. None of the news coverage of the Lirette verdict addresses them, and the public record does not show which were invoked in this case.
The emergency care gross negligence standard
O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5, part of Georgia's 2005 reforms that survived Nestlehutt, raises the bar for health care liability claims arising from emergency medical care provided in a hospital emergency department, an obstetrical unit, or a surgical suite immediately after emergency department evaluation. For those claims, the plaintiff must prove gross negligence by clear and convincing evidence, rather than ordinary negligence by a preponderance. Georgia courts have treated whether care qualified as bona fide emergency medical care as a question that can go to the jury.
Because the statute names obstetrical units, defendants in labor-and-delivery cases frequently argue it applies. Its application turns on whether the care at issue was a bona fide emergency response to an acute condition, as opposed to routine labor management that later became an emergency. Published reports do not say whether the defense invoked § 51-1-29.5 in the Lirette trials or which standard the jury was instructed on. If it was raised and rejected, or raised and the jury found gross negligence anyway, that will feature in post-trial briefing.
Offer of settlement fees
Under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68, if a plaintiff made a qualifying offer of settlement that the defendant rejected, and the final judgment exceeds 125 percent of that offer, the plaintiff may recover reasonable attorney fees and litigation expenses from the date of rejection through entry of judgment. The award is mandatory unless the court finds the offer was not made in good faith. In a case litigated for eight years through three trials, any rejected offer could translate into a substantial fee award on top of the verdict. Whether the Lirettes made such an offer has not been reported.
Prejudgment interest
Georgia's Unliquidated Damages Interest Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14, allows a plaintiff who made a proper written demand that the defendant did not accept within 30 days to recover prejudgment interest if the judgment equals or exceeds the demand. Secondary sources describe the rate as the prime rate plus three percentage points, and the interest is awarded by the trial court, not the jury. Georgia courts construe the statute strictly, including its notice requirements.
| Georgia rule | What it does | Possible effect on the Lirette verdict |
|---|---|---|
| Nestlehutt (2010) | Struck the $350,000 malpractice noneconomic cap | $150M pain-and-suffering award not reduced by statute |
| O.C.G.A. § 9-10-184 (SB 68, 2025) | Limits timing and basis of noneconomic damages argument | Closing argument may be scrutinized on appeal |
| O.C.G.A. § 51-12-15 (SB 68, 2025) | Allows any party to elect bifurcation | Not reported whether elected |
| SB 68 medical damages rule | Paid-not-billed evidence for claims arising on or after April 21, 2025 | Does not apply to a 2018 claim |
| O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5 | Gross negligence, clear and convincing evidence, for emergency obstetrical care | Not reported whether invoked |
| O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 | Attorney fees if judgment exceeds 125% of rejected offer | Depends on any pre-trial offer |
| O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14 | Prejudgment interest after an unaccepted written demand | Depends on any statutory demand |
Will the $164 million birth injury verdict be reduced on appeal?
It may be challenged, but there is no automatic reduction: Georgia has no malpractice damages cap, so any reduction would have to come from the trial judge on a post-trial motion, such as a motion for new trial or a request for remittitur on the ground that the award is excessive, or from an appellate court reviewing the verdict and the trial record.
The usual sequence in Georgia is entry of judgment on the verdict, then post-trial motions in the Superior Court, then an appeal to the Court of Appeals of Georgia. A defendant seeking to cut a pain-and-suffering award typically argues that the amount is so excessive that it reflects passion or prejudice, or that improper argument or evidentiary rulings infected the damages finding. Georgia appellate courts give substantial deference to jury findings on noneconomic damages, which the law describes as measured by the enlightened conscience of an impartial jury, and the Fulton County $75 million affirmance in 2025 shows that large awards can survive.
Four issues are likely to frame any challenge here.
- Size of the noneconomic award. At $150 million, the pain-and-suffering award is roughly eleven times the economic damages. Defendants will argue it is untethered from the evidence; the plaintiffs will point to a nine-year-old's lifelong brain injury and decades of future suffering.
- The closing argument under SB 68. If counsel argued a specific figure and the defense objected, the rational-relationship requirement of § 9-10-184 gives the defense a statutory ground that did not exist before 2025.
- The set-aside mistrial. Judge Voyles's ruling that the 2025 mistrial was improper is unusual, and the defense may contend the case should not have proceeded as it did. How strong that argument is depends on the order itself, which has not been made public.
- The standard of care instruction. If the court declined to instruct under § 51-1-29.5, or instructed on it and the jury found gross negligence, both choices will be scrutinized.
There is also the practical question of collectability. Large malpractice verdicts against individual physicians and small practices often exceed available professional liability insurance by a wide margin, and many resolve post-verdict through negotiated settlements within or near policy limits, sometimes combined with bad-faith claims against the insurer if earlier settlement opportunities were refused. None of that has been reported in the Lirette case, and the eventual payment may differ substantially from the headline figure.
How long do you have to file a birth injury lawsuit in Georgia?
In Georgia, a parent's own medical malpractice claim must generally be filed within two years, but a child injured before age five has until his or her seventh birthday to file a malpractice claim, under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-73(b), subject to the state's statute of repose. Because the deadlines for parents and child differ and exceptions exist, families typically file both sets of claims together, as the Lirettes did in 2018.
The Statute of Limitations question matters for practitioners evaluating similar cases. A family whose child was injured at birth may still have a viable claim several years later, even after a parent's own claim has expired, which means birth injury cases often surface well after the delivery. Georgia also requires an expert affidavit with a malpractice complaint, which front-loads expert costs for plaintiffs' firms.
What it means for plaintiffs' counsel, defendants and funders
The Lirette verdict confirms that Georgia remains a no-cap venue for catastrophic medical malpractice injuries, and that a rural county jury will return a nine-figure award where liability and causation are proved. It also shows that SB 68 has changed the mechanics of the trial without changing the ceiling.
What it means for plaintiffs' trial lawyers
- Build the noneconomic damages figure transparently from the evidence of the child's injury, prognosis and life expectancy, argue it once at the first opportunity in closing, and keep it constant; the post-2025 statute rewards an evidence-based bridge to the number.
- Persistence can pay. A case that hung in 2023 and was derailed in 2025 produced a record award in 2026. Firms budgeting birth injury cases should account for the possibility of multiple trials and an eight-year horizon.
- Statutory offer-of-settlement and prejudgment interest demands made early in the case can materially increase the value of a later verdict, and should be documented with strict compliance.
What it means for physicians, practices and malpractice insurers
- Venue no longer reliably protects defendants: a South Georgia county produced the largest reported Georgia malpractice verdict.
- Preserving objections to damages argument under § 9-10-185 and evaluating a bifurcation election under § 51-12-15 are now baseline trial tactics in Georgia malpractice defense.
- In obstetrical cases, the § 51-1-29.5 gross-negligence standard should be evaluated early, since its application depends on fact-intensive questions about whether the care was a bona fide emergency response.
- Reserves and policy limits for obstetric practices should be reassessed against a venue landscape where a $150 million pain-and-suffering award is possible.
What it means for litigation funders and lien holders
- Birth injury cases in Georgia carry high expected value but long durations and real retrial risk. The Lirette timeline, three trials over eight years, is a useful stress test for funding models built on Third-Party Litigation Funding.
- The gap between verdict and collection, driven by insurance limits and appellate risk, should be priced in. A headline verdict is a starting point for post-trial negotiation, not a payout figure.
- Medical Lien holders, including Medicaid where it paid for a child's care, will look to the $13.4 million medical component.
This analysis describes reported facts and Georgia law; it is not legal advice.
What happens next in the case?
The next steps are entry of judgment in the Superior Court of Thomas County, any post-judgment motions for attorney fees or interest, and the defendants' post-trial motions, which may include a motion for new trial. If those motions are denied, an appeal to the Court of Appeals of Georgia would follow, and the losing party there could seek certiorari in the Supreme Court of Georgia. Settlement is possible at any point.
Practitioners should watch for four documents: the itemized verdict form, which will show any apportionment and separate parental awards; the judgment, which will show any added fees or interest; Judge Voyles's order setting aside the 2025 mistrial; and the defendants' motion for new trial, which will reveal whether SB 68's anchoring rules or the § 51-1-29.5 emergency standard are part of the appeal.
FAQ
How much was the Georgia birth injury verdict against Dr. Joseph Novak?
A Thomas County jury awarded $164,586,856 on November 18, 2026 to Charis and Ben Lirette against Dr. Joseph Novak and Shaw Center for Women's Health, including $150 million for their son Grayson's pain and suffering, about $13.4 million for medical expenses and about $1.1 million for lost earning capacity.
What did the jury find in the Lirette case?
The jury found that Dr. Novak and Shaw Center for Women's Health failed to recognize and appropriately respond to Charis Lirette's ongoing placental abruption, causing Grayson's permanent brain injury. The defendants denied liability.
Why did the Lirette case go to trial three times?
The 2023 trial ended in a mistrial after the jury deadlocked, and a 2025 trial ended in a mistrial declared before deliberations over closing-argument remarks; Judge Gregory Voyles later found that second mistrial ruling improper and set it aside, and the third trial produced the verdict.
Is $164 million the largest medical malpractice verdict in Georgia history?
The family's lawyers say it is, and that it is the fourth-largest birth injury verdict in the country. It is more than double the $77 million DeKalb County and $75 million Fulton County malpractice verdicts of 2022 that were previously described as Georgia records.
Does Georgia cap damages in medical malpractice cases?
No. The Supreme Court of Georgia struck down the $350,000 noneconomic damages cap in Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery v. Nestlehutt (2010), and the 2025 SB 68 tort reform did not reinstate a cap.
Did Georgia's SB 68 tort reform affect the $164 million verdict?
SB 68 did not reduce the award, but its rewrite of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-184 limited how the plaintiffs could argue the pain-and-suffering figure at the 2026 trial, and compliance with those rules may be tested on appeal. Its paid-not-billed medical damages rule does not apply to a claim filed in 2018.
Published for legal professionals. Analysis and summaries only — not legal advice, and no attorney-client relationship is created by use of this site.
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